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INTRODUCTION
With the explosion of technology has come the opportunity for
nearly every aspect of a person's life to be monitored.' A phone GPS
can detect a person's whereabouts at any time; keystroke monitors
can record anything a person types on a keyboard; cameras can and
do monitor movements in schools, stores, parking lots, homes, and
many other places; software can capture real-time chats; email can be
accessed by the provider of the service; and internet access points can
be pinpointed, even if a person is not using his/her own computer.
* Professor of Legal Writing, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I would like to thank my
research assistant Monica Giangardella for all of her help. I would also like to thank Ariana
Levinson of the University of Louisville Law School, who is, as far as I'm concerned, the
expert in the field of electronic privacy law.
1. See generally Daniel Solove, The Digital Person: Privacy and Technology in the
Information Age (2004) (exploring how public-and private-sector databases create "digital
dossiers"-a perpetual series of records detailing nearly every aspect of a person's life).
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None of these technologies even consider the voluntary nature of
disclosed personal activities-Facebook, internet blogs, listserv
discussions, twitter posts, and even forwarded emails.2 For all intents
and purposes, our lives are open books, even if we take great strides
to limit our disclosures.
One area where this becomes especially problematic is in the
workplace. 3  Although most people would agree that employers have
many rights when it comes to scrutinizing arguably "personal"
activities-sending threatening or harassing communications to co-
workers, using work time to engage in personal social networking, or
disclosing company secrets---many employees have run into
situations where employers may have crossed the line when
disciplining or discharging an employee for personal activities that
seem unrelated to the job. These activities include those that occur
outside of work, such as the posting comments on a personal (or even
anonymous public) blog,6 or posting pictures and/or comments on a
quasi-private Facebook page. The activities may also include those
2. See Tonn Petersen, Redening "Privacy" in the Era of Social-Networking, 53
ADvOC. 27 (2010) (discussing the "exploding popularity of social networking" sites).
3. See generally Ariana R. Levinson, What Hath the Twenty First Century Wrought?
Issues in the Workplace Arising from New Technologies and How Arbitrators are Dealing
with Them, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BuS. L. 9 (2010).
4. See, e.g., Neal Buethe & Sally Scoggin, Doocing the Blogzilla: Managing Workplace
E-Communications, BENCH & B. MINN. (June 1, 2007), available athttp://mnbenchbar.com/
2007/06/e-comrnunications/ (employee fired after "reportedly post[ing] satirical accounts of
life at work" on her personal blog); see also Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156, 1158 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (holding that an employer having "notice that one of its employees
is using a workplace computer to access [child] pornography .. . has a duty to ... take prompt
and effective action to stop the unauthorized activity").
5. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (holding that employer had
a right to review lewd text messages sent on Company issued Blackberry); see also Bob E.
Lype, Employment Law and New Technologies: Emerging Trends Affecting Employers, 47
TENN. B.J. 20 (2011); Robert Sprague, Orwell was an Optimist The Evolution of Privacy in
the United States and its De-Evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83
(2008).
6. See Robert Sprague, Fired for Blogging: Are There Legal Protections for Employees
Who Blog?, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 355 (2007); see also Marshall v. Mayor of Savannah,
366 F. App'x 91 (11th Cir. 2010) (discharge for posting "inappropriate" photos on MySpace);
Shelby Cnty. Sheriff's Office, FMCS # 08-00865, 2009 WL 7323374 (Dec. 8, 2009) (Fullmer,
Arb.) (discharge even though employee blogged with a pseudonym); Ellen Simonetti, I was
fired for blogging, CNET NEWS (Dec. 16, 2004, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/1-was-fired-
for-blogging/2010-1030_3-5490836.html.
7. See, e.g., Don McIntosh, Workers Fired for Facebook Posts; 1ERB Investigates,
NORTHWEST LABOR PRESS (May 6, 2011), http://www.nwiaborpress.org/2011/0506/5-6-
I IFB.html (employee filed complaint with NLRB after she was fired for venting about her job
to friends via Facebook posts); Auto Club ires 27 in Message Board Crackdown, USA
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that occur during the work day, such as forwarding a seemingly
innocuous email, or making a personal comment in an email when
there is no general prohibition on this activity.
In most instances, neither the employer nor the employee is truly
of certain of his or her rights or obligations. However, in most cases,
it is usually the employee who suffers the consequences when the
employer decides that an activity discovered through electronic
monitoring is something that should be subject to discipline or
discharge.
This article will examine the issues regarding employee privacy
created by a world where nearly everything can be discovered by
some form of electronic monitoring. It will posit that most laws today
do little to apprise either the employer or the employee of the legality
of electronic monitoring of personal communications. It will further
posit that most employer policies related to scrutinizing employee
electronic communications are vague and unsuitable. The article will
moreover assert that, given the (often justifiable) leeway that
employers tend to have in monitoring employees, there is little chance
that we will soon see any standardization of laws regarding what can
be done with electronically obtained information.
The author concludes that vague privacy laws and policies are
bad for both employers and employees, and result in unnecessary
litigation. In doing so, the author demonstrates that the only real
standardization we might expect to see regarding any limitation
employers may have in using electronically obtained personal
information would have to come from the unions and union
negotiation. Given that the current laws regarding obtaining and
using electronic communications are inconsistent at best, it may only
be strong unions that are be able to negotiate clauses that provide the
definitive limitations for when an employer may use electronically
obtained personal communications for purposes of discipline or
discharge. Standardized policies would be beneficial for both
employers and employees, and if these policies begin to exist in the
unionized sector, we may see more of them adopted in the private
sector.
TODAY (Aug. 6, 2005, 12:42 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-08-06-posters-




EXACTLY WHAT CAN AN EMPLOYER MONITOR AND WHAT CAN BE DONE
WITH IT?
Both employers and employees often ask (1) what is allowed to
be monitored and (2) what can be done with the resulting information.
The answers to both questions are an employer can monitor virtually
anything, and almost anything can be done with the monitored
communication. Limitations are few and far between, especially if
the employer has posted a monitoring policy.9 Additionally, courts
are generally willing to uphold discipline and discharges of
employees as long as the action resulted from the discovery of an
activity that had some relationship to work duties.' 0
In terms of employee monitoring, the truth is that there are some
things every employee knows he or she should not be doing over the
employer's internet or email system, and that person should not be
surprised when there are consequences for such actions. Most
situations are matters of common sense and have nothing to do with
whether the information was discovered by electronic means. For
8. See, e.g., Mindy C. Calisti, You Are Being Watched: The Need for Notice in
Employer Electronic Monitoring, 96 KY. L.J. 649, 662 (2008) (noting that "very few states
regulate employers' monitoring of e-mail and Internet activity").
9. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (upholding
employee discharge for the inappropriate content of an e-mail, despite the fact that the
company had stated that it would not monitor e-mail messages); Cicero H. Brabham, Jr.,
Cunouser and Curiouser: Are Employers the Modern Day Alice in Wonderland? Closing the
Ambiguity in Federal Privacy Law As Employers Cyber-Snoop Beyond the Workplace, 62
RUTGERS L. REV. 993, 1018 (2010) (discussing how employers now reference their
monitoring policies to claim legitimate access to employees' cyber activities). In a Wired
magazine article, one author suggests that notice of monitoring is the central consideration:
[I]f an employee is led to expect something is private, such as e-mail
communications, then that privacy cannot be violated. But, if the company informs
its employees that, for example, e-mail sent over the company's network is
monitored, then the employee can no longer claim an "expectation of privacy." In
short, once the company stakes its claim over its cyber-dominion, its employees
have no right to privacy there.
Jeffrey Benner, Privacy at Work? Be Serious, WIRED NEWS (Mar. 1, 2001),
http://www.wired.com/techbizlmedia/news/2001/03/42029.
10. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App'x 637, 638-39 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended
(Aug. 27, 2009) (holding that transfer of employee to a different position was proper on
grounds that her internet blog included highly personal and offensive comments about her
employers, union representatives, and fellow teachers). But see Donald Carrington Davis,
Myspace Isn't Your Space: Expanding the Fair Credit Reporting Act to Ensure Accountability
and Fairness in Employer Searches of Online Social Networking Services, KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 237, 244 (Winter 2006-07) (pointing out that online social networking profiles often
present personal information about a potential employee that would not be appropriate subjects
of employer-employee dialogue within the scope of the hiring process, i.e. religious views).
254 [49:251
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instance, if a camera captures an employee selling drugs on company
property, that employee should expect the employer to discharge
her." If an employee works for a company where the employee's job
is to communicate with customers online, that employee should
reasonably expect the employer to discipline him if monitoring
discovers that he was surfing the internet rather than dealing with
customers.' 2 Additionally, an employee who sends threatening or
sexually harassing emails through the company computer system also
should expect his employer to discipline him.'3
In each of these cases, most reasonable people would think that
the employer was well within its rights to both monitor certain things
electronically and discipline an employee where the monitoring
discloses inappropriate work conduct. Issues arise, however, in a few
major instances:
1. When the action of the employee does not occur during
working hours (such as maintaining a personal blog or
sending email while at home).14
11. See, e.g., Padron v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1256 (S.D.
Fl. 2002), affd62 F. App'x 317 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that discharge was legitimate when
employee violated company policies by accessing a business account for her brother);
Terwilliger v. Howard Mem'l Hosp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 980, 982 (W.D. Ark. 2011) (holding that
termination was proper when employee was caught on camera stealing or attempting to steal
from another employee's desk drawer).
12. See, e.g., Flynn v. AT&T Yellow Pages, 780 F. Supp. 2d 886, 889 (E.D. Mo. 2011)
(holding that discharge was proper when an investigation revealed that employee used his
work computer for personal activities, including downloading hundreds of files of non-work-
related material and surfing the internet for several hours during work time); AFSCME
Council 4, Local 1565, 37 Lab. Arb. Info. Sys. 194 (June 3, 2009) (finding that termination
was for just cause when an investigation showed that employee spent at least one hour of each
work day surfing the internet and that he had actively searched for pornography).
13. See, e.g., Alberto v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 98 M.S.P.R. 50, 55 (M.S.P.B. 2004),
affd05-3090, 2005 WL 1368150 (Fed. Cir. June 10, 2005) (disciplining employee for, among
other acts, sending an unsolicited email over his employer's email system that was not
business related and contained material of a sexual nature that the recipients found
objectionable); Husen v. Dow Chem. Co., 03-10202-BC, 2006 WL 901210, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 31, 2006) (upholding Arbitrator's decision that the employer was justified in terminating
employee for sending sexually explicit emails).
14. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. Sheriffs Office, FMCS # 08-00865, 2009 WL 7323374,
(Dec. 8, 2009) (Fullmer, Arb.) (deputy discharged for, among other acts, blog postings even
though he did not use his real name or state that he was an employee of the Sheriff's office);
John S. Hong, Can Blogging and Employment Co-Exist, 41 U.S.F. L. Rev. 445, 451 (2007)
(programmer Mark Pilgrim fired after his manager demanded Pilgrim abandon his personal
blog, which included an essay reflecting on Pilgrim's past addictions to nicotine, alcohol, and
marijuana, and in response Pilgrim posted his resume on the blog); Simonetti, supra note 6
(Delta Airlines flight attendant fired after posting risqu6 pictures of herself in her uniform on
2552012]
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2. When the employer does not have a policy that prohibits
using company equipment for personal use (such as
when an employer allows an email account to be used to
send and receive personal communications).' 5
3. When the employer acquires the information through
indirect means (such as when an email is forwarded or a
co-worker "captures" otherwise private information and
brings it to the attention of the employer). 16
4. When the employer acquires information that was
originally private (and not at all related to the employer's
job duties), happened at some point in the past, but
somehow still can be gleaned through an internet search
engine (such as when an employer is still able to
discover a lewd photo from an employee's college
days).'"
her blog); Kathryn S. Wenner, Scribe's Secret AM. JOURNALISM REV. (Sep. 1, 2002),
http://www.ajr.orglarticle.asp?id=2612 (Houston Chronicle reporter Steve Olafson terminated
as a result of postings on his personal blog); Liz Wolgemuth, Five Ways Your Computer Use
Can Get You Fired U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar 11, 2008),
http://www.money.usnews.com/money/careers/articles/2008/03/11/5-ways-your-computer-
use-can-get-you-fired (CNN producer Chez Pazienza fired when the company discovered his
personal blog).
15. Compare Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that
employee had reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of workplace computer where the
employer did not have a general practice of routinely searching office computers, and had not
notified the plaintiff that he should have no expectation of privacy in the contents of his office
computer), with Kelleher v. City of Reading, No. CIV.A.01-3386, 2002 WL 1067442, at *8
(E.D. Pa. May 29, 2002) (holding that employee did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy as to her e-mail messages sent and received using the employer-provided e-mail
system, because the employer's guidelines explicitly provided that there was no such
expectation of privacy).
16. See, e.g., Wall St. Source, Inc. & Niki Lee, No. 2-CA-38727, 2009 WL 909251
(N.L.R.B. Apr. 1, 2009) (employee fired when IM exchanges with fellow employee
complaining about the company's insurance policies were forwarded to supervisor); Kathleen
Elliott Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal Field: Just "Face"
It 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 355, 399 (2010) (discussing a judge's discovery, by way of Facebook,
that an attorney who had asked for a continuance due to an alleged death in the family had
instead engaged in a week of partying); Rick Borutta, Waitress Serves Sour Grapes on
Facebook, Gets Fired, CBS NEWS (May 25, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
501465_162-20005894-501465.html (waitress fired for complaining about customers on her
Facebook page).
17. See, e.g., Emily H. Fulmer, Privacy Expectations and Protections for Teachers in the
Internet Age, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 14, 53 (2010) (teacher allegedly coerced by school
administrators into resigning after they questioned photographs on the teacher's Facebook
256 [49: 251
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Most employees would not think that their jobs could be at stake
on the basis of having done something regrettable during a spring
break trip while in college, or by griping to a friend on Facebook
about a bad day at work; however, that is exactly what can occur.18
THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING LAWS AS THEY Now STAND
The laws regarding the "interception" and use of electronic
"communications" is a hodgepodge of federal and state rules.19 Some
were enacted at a time when the internet did not exist, 20 while others
were enacted without foresight as to how they might be employed in
the workplace. 21 The application of these laws to discharge situations
requires judges and arbitrators to "put a square peg in a round hole."
While lawmakers may have envisioned monitoring employees' work-
related, egregiously inappropriate behavior, in practice it has extended
far outside of the regular workday. 22
page that were taken during a past European vacation and depicted her with alcoholic
beverages); see also Catharine Smith & Craig Kanalley, Fired over Facebook: 13 Posts that
Got People Canne4 HUFFINGTON POST (July 26, 2010), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2010/
07/26/fired-over-facebook-posts_n_659170.html#sl 15707&title=SwissWomanCaught.
18. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 10, at 239 (citing a survey finding that sixty-three
percent of employers that search social networking profiles online have rejected candidates
based upon information found within those profiles).
19. See generally Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible and Invisible Worlds:
United States Privacy Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
357, 359 (2000) (describing United States privacy laws as "a very diverse collection of many
different types of privacy laws," which has generated widespread criticism of America's
privacy laws as "piecemeal" or "fragmented"). "A number of years ago a federal appeals court
judge described United States privacy law as like a 'haystack in a hurricane."' Id.
20. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-621 (2012); Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2012); Wiretap Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-19 (2012); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-21, 2701-10, 3121-26 (2012); Stored Communications Act of 1986, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701-11(2012). See generally Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering
the Lessons of the Wiretap Act 56 ALA. L. REv. 9, 41 (2004) (emphasizing that "when
Congress passed the ECPA [Electronic Communications Privacy Act] in 1986, electronic
communications were in their infancy," the World Wide Web had not yet been developed, and
only a small number of people used electronic mail).
21. See, e.g., Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First
Century Framework for Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. Bus. L.J. 285, 293-94 (2011) (pointing
out that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act is futile in today's workplace
environment, because "technology has advanced to a point that almost no transmissions are
covered by the statute").
22. See Charles E. Frayer, Employee Privacy and Internet Monitoring: Balancing
Workers' Rights and Dgnity with Legitimate Management Interests, 57 BUS. LAW. 857, 859
(2002) (noting that "[a]ccording to the American Management Association, which asked
employers whether they monitor Internet connections, an astounding sixty-one percent of
2012] 257
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THE FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT AND THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVACY ACT
The primary federal statutes that cover acquiring electronic
information are part of what was originally called the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act.23 The original Wiretap Act was enacted
in 1968,24 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which
amended the Wiretap Act, was enacted in 1986.25 The internet did
not exist in 1968, and the primary focus of the original Wiretap Act
was prohibiting inappropriate interception of telephone
26communications.
According to the Act it is unlawful for an individual to "intercept
or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication."27 A few exceptions were made for providers of the
service, employers, and when there was consent for the interception. 28
responding firms acknowledged doing so. In addition, the Privacy Foundation's Workplace
Surveillance Project found that fourteen million American workers are under continuous
online surveillance, and that employee-monitoring software sales have reached $140 million
annually."). But see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2012) (forbids termination by
employer based on "any lawful activity [conducted] off the premises of the employer during
nonworking hours .... ); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2011) (forbids failing or refusing to
hire, in addition to forbidding discharge, based on lawful off-duty conduct during nonworking
hours); see also Davis, supra note 10, at 245-46 (noting that some states have placed limits on
employer monitoring outside the workplace).
23. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, supra note 20.
24. See JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, Privacy and Civil Liberties (Mar. 20, 2012),
http://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area-privacy&page=1284 (Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act was known as the "Wiretap Act." The Act strictly regulates the
interception of wire and oral communications, providing both criminal and civil liabilities for
violators of the statute's prohibitions. Congress passed the Act in response to investigations
and studies finding extensive wiretapping had been conducted by government agencies and
private individuals without the consent of the parties or legal sanction.).
25. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, supra note 20; see also Jarrod J.
White, E-Mail@work.com: Employer Monitoring ofEmployee E-Mail, 48 ALA. L. REv. 1079,
1080-81 (1997) ("The ECPA amended Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, and was passed in response to Congress' perception that the privacy
protection of the 1968 Act was limited to narrowly defined 'wire' and 'oral'
communication.").
26. But see United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 79 (1st Cir. 2005) (analyzing
application of the Wiretap Act outside the context of telephone communications, holding that
"temporarily stored e-mail messages ... constitute electronic communications within the
scope of the Wiretap Act. . . .").
27. 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(l)(a) (2012).
28. Id. §§ 2511(2)(d)--(e). Consent is an overlapping concept, because a person who is
employed could theoretically consent directly to a particular type of monitoring, or consent to
refraining from doing something in a very broad sense (such as maintaining a harassment free
258 [49:251
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The use of the word "interception" created such ambiguity that made
it difficult to apply this statute to electronic communications that are
"acquired" by an employer.29 Originally, an interception was defined
as acquiring the contents of a communication while the
communication was in transit prior to its arriving at its destination
(such as listening in on a phone conversation). 30 However, many of
these courts were forced to struggle with the technical details of email
messages in an attempt to determine whether the message was
intercepted en route, or acquired after it had been delivered.
Also at issue, at least in terms of the employer and employee
relationship, was whether an interception, if it occurred in a legal
sense, fell within one of the statutory exceptions. 32 The two primary
exceptions to the statute are related to (1) whether the interception
occurs within the ordinary course of business, and (2) whether the
employee has consented to the monitoring.33 As previously indicated,
environment at work). Consent need not be explicit, it can also be implied. See Williams v.
Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 281 (1st Cir. 1993). "Implied consent is 'consent in fact' which is
inferred from surrounding circumstances indicating that the party knowingly agreed to the
surveillance." Id The indirect consent is what can be expanded so that the employee might be
consenting to monitoring not originally considered.
29. See generally Michael D. Roundy, The Wiretap Act-Reconcilable Differences: A
Framework for Determining the "Interception" of Electronic Communications Following
United States v Councilman's Rejection of the Storage/transit Dichotomy, 28 W. NEW ENG.
L. REv. 403, 414 (2006) (noting that the question of when the acquisition of an electronic
communication constitutes an "intercept" in violation of the Act is one that has posed major
challenges for courts).
30. See, e.g., Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding an interception
when defendant store owners used a recording device to monitor telephone calls to and from
the store).
31, See, e.g., United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005); Hall v.
EarthLink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2005); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S.
Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
32. See, e.g., Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 280 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that
defendant company's system for electronically monitoring employee phone calls was not
protected by neither the "business extension" nor "consent" exceptions to federal wiretap law,
and that the system was "precisely the type of intercepting device Congress intended to
regulate heavily when it enacted Title III"); Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581
(llth Cir. 1983) (analyzing the applicability of the consent exception in a Title III action
brought by an employee of a telemarketing firm based upon her employer's interception of a
personal telephone call); Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that where a supervisor listened in on a business call between an employee and his
friend, an employee of a competitor, based on his suspicion that the employee was revealing
confidential information to the competitor, his actions fell under the business use exemption).
33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(d), (e); see also Benjamin F. Sidbury, You've Got Mail...
and Your Boss Knows It: Rethinking the Scope of the Employer E-Mail Monitonng
Exceptions to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 2001 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 5 (2001)
(discussing the "consent" and "ordinary course of business" exceptions to Title III of the
2012]1 259
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one of the major issues related to consent was whether the monitoring
went beyond the scope of consent given by the employee.34
The Stored Electronic Communications Act, which is part of
Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
prohibits the unauthorized "retrieval" of electronic communications
and was enacted to close some of the loopholes related to email and
other types of stored electronic communication.35 With respect to
employers, courts have interpreted the statute to mean that similar
exceptions that apply to intercepted communications, also apply to
stored communications. 6 Thus, where an employer retrieved a
communication in the ordinary course of business, many courts have
held that the statute has not been violated. Moreover, where an
employee consented to the monitoring of retrieved information, courts
have also concluded that there has been no violation of the statute.38
ECPA as they apply to the monitoring of employees' electronic communications).
34. See, e.g., Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d
548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Rassoull v. Maximus, Inc., 93 F. App'x. 495 (4th Cir. 2004); In re
Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003); Shefts v. Petrakis, 758 F. Supp. 2d 620 (C.D. Ill.
2010); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996).
35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012); see also Theofel v. Farey Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 982
(9th Cir. 2003) opinion amended and superseded on denial ofreh 'g sub nom. Theofel v. Farey-
Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the SCA "reflects Congress's judgment that
users have a legitimate interest in the confidentiality of communications in electronic storage
at a communications facility"). See generally Alexander Scolnik, Protections for Electronic
Communications: The Stored Communications Act and the Fourth Amendmen4 78 FORDHAM
L. REv. 349, 375 (2009) (describing the Stored Communications Act and its protection of e-
mails, text messages, and other forms of electronic communications).
36. The Act exempts conduct "authorized .. . by the person or entity providing a wire or
electronic communications service," 18 U.S.C § 2701(c)(1), or "by a user of that service with
respect to a communication of or intended for that user,"18 U.S.C § 2701(c)(2).
37. See, e.g., Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding
that messages between employees over City intranet could lawfully be accessed by employer).
"§ 2701(c)(1) allows service providers to do as they wish when it comes to accessing
communications in electronic storage. Because the City is the provider of the 'service,' neither
it nor its employees can be liable under § 2701." Id.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2) (2012); see also, e.g., Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp.
2d at 599 (holding that accessing and obtaining e-mails directly from an electronic
communication service provider is a violation of the SCA if done without authorization).
Note that one of the major issues that arises regarding the authorization exception is to what
exactly the employee has consented. For instance, in City ofOntario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619,
2629 (2011), the employee consented to the monitoring of text messaging minutes and
destinations, but incorrectly believed that the content of his messages would remain private.
The authorization exception may also work in favor of the employee in circumstances where
the employer's policy is not specific enough to include the activity that brought about the
alleged invasion of privacy. For example, in Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 559,
the court held that the employer's consent defense, which was based on the company's email
policy, could not apply to e-mails on systems maintained by outside entities such as Microsoft
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Courts typically predicate the application of both of these rules on the
form and scope of the consent that the employer has obtained. In
practice however, most courts have interpreted the provisions of the
ECPA broadly in favor of employers.
As previously indicated, there are a great many "retrievals" and
"interceptions" that one should not expect an employee to object to.
If working for a package delivery company, an employee might
expect an employer to object if GPS monitoring demonstrated that the
employee made numerous personal detours during the work day. An
employee who works for a company that issued him or her a
cellphone might expect that employer to object if scrutiny of
cellphone usage revealed that the employee was making personal
calls that were charged to the company. An employee of a customer
service firm might expect an employer to object if screen captures
demonstrated that the employee was doing things on the internet other
than dealing with customers. Quite often, employees will
acknowledge an employer's right to so monitor when accepting an
offer of employment.
But in terms of what might be monitored on the job, employers
have other concerns that go beyond productivity and profitability.
Employers are obligated to provide a safe and non-threatening
environment for employees 39 and often have internal policies
regarding safety, and proscribing threatening behavior (both sexual
threats and harassment, as well as physical threats). Employees can
easily prevail in an action against the employer if inappropriate
behavior occurs in the workplace and the employer "should have
known about it.,4 0  Moreover, employers are liable for harm
or Google, because the policy, by its own terms, was limited to "Company equipment." See
also TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Cout, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 163 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy when he used his home
computer for personal matters, because he had consented to such monitoring by signing his
employer's "electronic and telephone equipment policy statement," thus agreeing in writing
that his employer could monitor his computers).
39. See, e.g., Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *6 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2002) (holding that even if the employees
terminated for sending sexually explicit emails had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
work email, the employer's legitimate business interest in protecting its employees from
harassment in the workplace would likely trump the two former employees' privacy interests).
See generally Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76 (1986) (explaining that a
supervisor's responsibilities do not begin and end with the power to hire, fire, and discipline
employees, but rather he or she is also charged with the day-to-day supervision of the work
environment and with ensuring a safe, productive workplace).
40. See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 341 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding
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employees might cause to members of the general public if there was
a means to discover that the employee was inappropriately dealing
with members of the public. 4 1
Few people would disagree that it is both the right and
responsibility of an employer to have the means to prevent sexual
harassment, threats of violence, disclosure of company secrets, or
committing crimes on the job. However, few people agree as to the
proper boundaries of the employer in accomplishing this goal.
It is rare that any straightforward prerogative of a responsible
employer becomes subject to litigation (e.g., checking whether an
employee has threatened another employee by using company email).
What tends to be litigated, however, are situations when the employer
is perceived to have overstepped its bounds. For instance, if an
employer, rather than merely monitoring internet usage for efficiency
purposes, uses personal information, which could uncover an affair or
some other kind of prohibited relationship, for disciplinary purposes.
Or if an employer, rather than monitoring whether a phone is being
used mostly for work, listens in on conversations to see who is being
called and for what. Or when an employer reads the content of
personal emails rather than merely determining the identity of the
recipient.
Those become difficult matters for courts, especially if an
employee has given an employer carte blanche authority to monitor
internet usage, phone usage, and email. In those situations, courts
tend to look at matters on a case-by-case basis and assess what was an
individual's expectation of privacy, and whether an employer may
have overstepped the bounds of its consent to monitor.
However, many alleged invasions of privacy in the workplace
have nothing at all to do with either monitoring or retrieval. Consider
the matter of the forwarded email that a co-worker regards as sexually
harassing, or even the forwarded email that expresses personal
sentiments that were intended to be private. Consider also a situation
where browsing the internet yields a discovery of information about
that an employer's responsibility to prevent future harassment is heightened where it is dealing
with a known serial harasser and therefore has clear notice that the same employee has
engaged in inappropriate behavior in the past); Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522,
1528 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that once an employer knows or should know of harassment, a
remedial obligation kicks in).
41. See, e.g., Med. Assur. Co., Inc. v. Castro, 302 S.W.3d 592, 597 (Ark. 2009)
(holding that an employer may be held directly liable when an employee harms a third party
and the employer knew or should have known of the danger).
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an employee that an employer believes reflects badly on the
employer. In neither of these cases would the electronic information
have been retrieved from an employee's work files or equipment, nor
could the information be considered "intercepted." Yet an employee
might still be subject to discipline or discharge depending on existing
work rules (e.g., "an employee may be discharged for engaging in any
activity that in any way reflects badly on the employer or is
disparaging of the employer"), or even on a mere whim of the
employer in the absence of any work rules, such as in an at-will
employment situation.42
And perhaps the question that many might ask is, is this fair-
especially if it is not the employee who has made the information
available to the employer, but rather a third party?
Certainly an employee who is complaining to a friend about a
bad day at work (whether the communication happens through a
company email or during an after-hours Facebook chat), would
neither expect the conversation to get back to her employer, nor
expect to be disciplined for it, but it does happen. From an
employer's perspective, if one person can discover the information, it
can be discovered by a multitude of people. If the information
disparages the reputation of the employer or puts the employer in
jeopardy of liability, then the employer should be able to discipline or
discharge the employee. Thus, absent clear policies about what can
be used for disciplinary purposes, chances are that anything
discoverable on the internet is fair game for use as a basis for
discipline or discharge.
Although it would be ideal to suggest that federal and state laws
should be modified to compel employers to write policies that explain
what electronic information could be used and how, this is an
unrealistic goal. Given that majority of employees are at-will, it is
unlikely that there would be any real motivation for employers to
explain what will not be used. Rather, it might be in the best interests
of the employer to keep any policies it has as broad as possible in
order to cover situations that are not necessarily foreseeable.
That said, this might not be the best tactic to take when
formulating work rules or even unwritten policies. It is generally
42. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that
the termination of the plaintiff employee for transmitting inappropriate and unprofessional
comments over the employer's email system was proper, even though the employer had no
policy forbidding the sending of such emails).
2012]) 263
WILLAMETTELAWREVIEW
agreed that employees have the right to engage in discussions about
"conditions in the workplace." Criticizing management is
sometimes considered to be part of discussing conditions of the
workplace, and various courts,4 as well as the National Labor
Relations Board, have upheld an employee's right to engage in
dialogue critical of management without fear of reprisal.45 But there
is a question as to when critical statements aimed at perhaps
improving a work situation become disparaging, derogatory, or
nonproductive. At what point does an employee lose his/her right to
vent on, for example, a public internet forum? Also, does it matter
what line of work that employee is in? Where the lines are should be
more specifically spelled out in order to benefit both employers and
employees.
43. Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 151-69, disciplining an employee for discussing conditions of employment may be
considered an unfair labor practice if the discussion involved a protected concerted activity.
Under section 7 of the Act, concerted activities are those that are engaged in "for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157. See, e.g., Carson
Strege-Flora, Wait! Don't Fie That Blogger! What Limits Does Labor Law Impose on
Employer Regulation of Employee Blogs?, 2 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 11, 12 (2005)
(discussing the limits imposed by the NLRB on employers' regulation of employee blogging
and noting that before disciplining a blogging employee, the employer must determine if the
blogger is engaged in protected "concerted activity." For example, if an employee can show
that complaints made about a supervisor are aimed at initiating, inducing, or preparing for
group activity, such discussion may be protected under the NLRA.).
44. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002) (protecting
employee's right to maintain a website in which he posted bulletins using strong language
attacking his employer's management and president); NLRB v. Oakes Mach. Corp., 897 F.2d
84, 86 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that three employees were protected when they wrote a letter
complaining about the activities of their company's president). But see NLRB v. Sheraton P.
R. Corp., 651 F.2d 49, 51-52 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that employee protest over general
manager was not protected since it was essentially a dispute among managers and had no
distinct impact on working conditions).
45. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Labor Panel to Press Reuters Over Reaction to
Twitter Post (April 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/business/media/07twitter.
html?_r-2&scp=l&sq=reuters%20and%20twitter&st-cse (discussing the NLRB's defense of
a reporter reprimanded for a public Twitter post criticizing management. The NLRB asserted
that disciplining the employee violated her right to discuss working conditions.); Sam Hananel,
Feds Settle Case of Woman Fired over Facebook Comments (February 7, 2011),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41465076/ns/technologyandscience-techand-gadgets/t/
feds-settle-case-woman-fired-over-facebook-comments/ (discussing the NLRB's settlement of
lawsuit brought on behalf of a woman fired for criticizing her boss on her Facebook page. The
Board argued that the employer's Internet policies interfered with workers' right to discuss
wages, hours, and working conditions with co-workers.).
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND REASONABLE WORK RULES
About the only arena where a workforce has any type of power
to negotiate at least some work rules is in collective bargaining.46
Although union contracts must integrate some aspects of federal law
(such as anti-discrimination laws, and adherence to both the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family Medical Leave
Act),47 union negotiation affords workers the opportunity to craft
certain rules unique to an employer or a particular set of workers.
With respect to privacy matters, (absent statutory proscriptions)
unions might be one of the only groups that have the ability to set out
in writing what would be the restrictions of using acquired electronic
communications for purposes of making adverse employment
decisions.
Currently, discipline and discharges related to electronically
acquired information are governed by a union employee's collective
bargaining agreement and its grievance procedure. Very few of these
collective bargaining agreements include any specific provisions
related to the use of electronic information, or even rules regarding
what, specifically, will be monitored.
In a collective bargaining setting, work rules are generally the
prerogative of the employer and are not even negotiated with the
union. According to the NLRA, employers working with a union
must negotiate the "terms and working conditions" of employment.
Quite often, the terms and working conditions of employment are
interpreted to mean (for the most part) hours, wages, lay-off
procedure, disciplinary step procedures, job duties, and seniority
rights.48 Ordinarily, things like lunch breaks, attendance policies,
vacation selection, and policies regarding a non-threatening work
environment are encompassed by a company's work rules, and, in
general, formulating work rules are the prerogative of the employer.
Often the rights to manage the workforce and formulate work rules
46. Those negotiating individual contracts have the power to negotiate some aspects of
their working environment. Professional athletes can do some of the same but are also
represented by a collective bargaining unit.
47. See5 U.S.C. §§ 7201-03 (2012).
48. Note that some state legislatures are now attempting to block unions from
negotiating over pension contributions. See, e.g., Florida Teachers File Lawsuit Over Pension,
NBC MIAMI (June 21, 2011), http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Florida-Teachers-File-
Lawsuit-Over-Pension-124281874.html (discussing a lawsuit filed by the Florida Education
Association challenging a recent law requiring teachers, state workers, and many local
government employees to contribute 3 percent of their pay to the state pension fund).
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are encompassed in a collective bargaining agreement's management
rights clause.
Sometimes, however, a union will reserve the right to negotiate
over work rules, or just some specialized "term and working
condition," (such as an attendance policy) while allowing the
company to formulate other work rules and general policies. In some
instances, work rules are incorporated into a collective bargaining
agreement through negotiation, and thus the rules themselves may not
be changed during the life of the agreement absent negotiation.
Finally, sometimes there is a dispute as to whether a clause is a "rule"
that management may change unilaterally, or a contractual provision
where a change must be negotiated. When there is a dispute, the
matter may be submitted to arbitration, or an unfair labor charge
(failure to negotiate a unilateral change in terms and conditions of
working conditions) may be brought before the National Labor
Relations Board. If an employer adds a new work rule (such as a new
policy on electronic monitoring) that was not a variation of what was
already part of the contract, both arbitrators and courts have
determined that a unilateral change cannot be made absent negotiation
with the union.
Thus, when collective bargaining tribunals have attempted to
interpret clauses related to the use of electronically acquired
information, they have done so by interpreting more general clauses
as opposed to specific clauses. Most disputes that have been
arbitrated have taken more of a common sense, balancing of factors
interpretation when applying work rules. Although some arbitrators
have been called on to interpret work rules as they related to
electronically acquired information, few (if any) have had the
opportunity to interpret very specific clauses related to the use of
electronically acquired information, especially information that was
not acquired by on-the-job monitoring.
A few specific cases demonstrate some of the ways in which
arbitrators have applied more general work rules in relation to
electronically acquired information.
For instance, in In re Baker Hughes and United Steelworkers,49
the arbitrator upheld the discharge of an employee who posted
derogatory remarks about his supervisor on his MySpace page.'0 The
49. 128 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 37, (April 9, 2010) (Baroni, Arb.).
50. The employee had posted, "Ask any Baker Petrolite Employee what they think of
the upper management. You might (hear) the words... German, green card terminator or
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posting was done while the employee was off the job, and appeared
on a MySpace blog that was open to the general public. In finding
discharge appropriate, the arbitrator noted that the company had a
code of conduct rule that prohibited threatening and harassing
behavior, and further noted that the collective bargaining agreement
gave the employer the right to adopt and enforce work rules. The
arbitrator further determined that off-duty conduct could be punished
if there was a sufficient nexus to the workplace.5'
In In re Shelby County Sheiffs Office, and FOP, Ohio Labor
Council, In. 2 , the Arbitrator upheld the discharge of a police officer
who had posted comments on a public blog. The comments criticized
an individual who had been running for office, and alleged that a
secretary had advanced her career by "sleeping around." Among
other charges, the employee was accused of violating a work rule that
prohibited an employee to "publicly criticize or ridicule the Sheriffs
Office, its policies, personnel, or supervisors." In that case, the
posted statement was made on a public blog, but the employee used a
pseudonym rather than his real name (although he never denied that
he was the one who posted the statements).
The arbitrator noted that, even though the union argued that the
comments were protected by the First Amendment, there was nothing
political at issue that would be protected by the First Amendment,
given the critical comments occurred long after the election
mentioned was over. The arbitrator also stated that even though no
humiliation was intended by accusing the secretary of sleeping around
(in fact, the union argued that the employee had made truthful
statements), the topic was humiliating.5 3  Thus, the arbitrator
concluded, the work rule had been violated and the discharge was
appropriate. 5
Finally, in In re Warren5 the arbitrator upheld the discharge of a
teacher whose estranged wife posted nude pictures of her ex-husband
some other four letter words that I won't etch down on the scrolls. That's enough said on that
subject. I could have sworn that Hitler committed suicide. Is there such a thing as
reincarnation?" Id. (No pagination designated in the case.).
51. Id; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 748 (1998); Meritor
Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986); Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d
128, 135 (2d Cir. 2001); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1301-02 (2d Cir. 1995).
52. FMCS No. 08-00865, 2009 WL 7323374 (Dec. 8, 2009) (Fullmer, Arb.).
53. Id.
54. It should be noted that the employee was accused of many more work violations, so
it is tough to separate any rule of law about electronic communications from the rest.
55. 124 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 532 (Oct. 4,2007) (Skulina, Arb.).
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on the internet so that students were able to see the pictures. In
finding the discharge appropriate, the arbitrator noted that the Ohio
Revised Code provided that teachers could be fired for engaging in
immoral behavior. Although the arbitrator concluded that the pictures
themselves were not immoral given that they were intended to be a
private matter between husband and wife, the situation changed when
they made their way to the internet. The arbitrator stated that
although the teacher did not post the pictures, he was in a position to
take steps to try to stop them from being posted and did not do
enough. The arbitrator also stated that because the pictures made
their way to the internet, the teacher could no longer undo the
situation, and, therefore, the teacher could not rehabilitate his
reputation and be an appropriate role model for his students.
In each of these situations, arbitrators took a common sense,
case-by-case, totality of the circumstances view of resolving issues
not directly controlled by any work rules or contractual provisions.
While this has its benefits in the realm of labor law (especially given
that majority of all labor arbitrations must look at balancing the
unique factors of each case), the case-by-case methodology has its
detriments outside the realm of labor law, where the damages can go
beyond reinstatement and back pay.
Moreover, even in labor law, resolving issues can be made easier
if there is clearer guidance for the parties and the arbitrator. If
contractual provisions are clear and spell out specific instances of
prohibited conduct, then it would ultimately be unnecessary for the
parties to go through the grievance process and labor arbitration. For
instance, in both Baker and Shelby, clear policies providing that
electronic postings made about work related issues on public blogs
were subject to discipline under the collective bargaining agreement
may have made the employees think twice about posting on the
internet. The teacher's discharge in Warren might have been
prevented if there had been a clear policy indicating that a teacher was
required to give notice of what amounted to a confidentiality breach
compromising a teacher's reputation. Moreover, a clear policy
related to internet posting by a third party might better protect an
employer if a civil suit were brought by the teacher.
Unfortunately, too often, attorneys who are in the position to
advise employers do not consider all of the measures that might be
taken to avoid litigation. Rather, work rules and other policies tend
only to be modified after a particular scenario has occurred or there
has been costly litigation.
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CAN UNIONS REALLY NEGOTIATE SUCH A PROVISION?
Currently, only about 11% of the workforce is unionized and
many would suggest that unions are not in any type of position of
power to be negotiating provisions that give employees more power
over their destinies than less. Several states-most noteworthy Ohio
and Wisconsin-have enacted legislation that has limited the power
of collective bargaining representatives to bargain over wages and
benefits for government employees. Economics also play a role
related to the power of unions. With much work being outsourced to
foreign countries that can perform the work cheaper, unions are rarely
in a position of power to be making demands of an employer.
The lack of power of collective bargaining representatives has
led to give backs and the elimination of numerous provisions in a
collective bargaining agreement that may have been standard in many
professions 40 years ago. Collective bargaining agreements often
limited the use of independent contractors, and, moreover, focused
promotions more on a seniority system rather than a system of merits
or a review of qualifications. With the overall professionalism of the
workforce, many union shops have begun looking more like private
employers, nearly to the point where some unionized workforces have
fewer protections than an at-will workforce.
As this article previously discussed, employers should and do
have many rights regarding what on-the-job policies are best to ensure
the success of the Company, and these may vary from employer to
employer. One area where the rules have increased vastly in the last
three decades has been in the area of drug testing. Few people would
argue that an employer should not have the right to prevent a pilot
suspected of being intoxicated from flying an airplane and then later
disciplining that pilot if it was proved the pilot had been intoxicated.
Moreover, it would not be unreasonable for an employer to fire an
employee for being intoxicated while operating heavy machinery
where being intoxicated could be dangerous to that employee and
other employees. In fact, it would be hard to argue that an employer
would not want any drugged or inebriated workers on the job whether
a safety concern could become a main issue. Simply put, inebriated
(or drugged) employees have their ability to function hindered, and
this could result in a deficient work product that causes the employee
profit or resources.
Although there has been drug testing in some professions for a
long period of time, the real movement toward overall drug testing
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began in the mid 1980s when Ronald Reagan signed an executive
order that conditioned federal employment on refraining from (illegal)
drug use, on or off the job. In 1988, Congress enacted the "Drug-Free
Workplace Act." 56  Thereafter, the concept of routine drug testing
became something more and more commonplace as time went on.5
The "War on Drugs" intensified as the 21st century approached,
and in 1998, Congress enacted the Drug Free Workplace program
appropriating money to give to businesses to keep workplaces drug
free.5 Thereafter, the concept of commonplace drug testing
expanded far beyond those employed in a governmental position.
Now, over a decade later, many courts have ruled that in an at-
will setting, there are few limitations on requiring employees to
undergo drug testing.59 Currently, even a trip to the local Home
Depot might result in seeing a sign for job applications that adds the
information, "We do random drug testing." Private employers can
formulate nearly any (non-discriminatory) method for hiring and
retaining its workforce, and employees have very little (if any) power
to do anything about this if they wish to be employed.
Unions are a bit different with respect to something like random
drug testing. Especially when dealing with safety issues, employers
began pushing 40 years ago for various policies that would enable
them to test those employees who were involved in industrial
accidents and those suspected of being inebriated. Employers then
pushed to negotiate provisions requiring random drug testing in order
to ensure a consistent "clean" workforce.
It was at this point that unions really began to push back, and in
many instances were able to negotiate provisions that limited the
complete power of the employer to fashion drug testing policies.
Rather, some unions were able to negotiate provisions that were
56. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-07 (1988); Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988)
(The Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 is part of the Anti-Drug Act of 1988.).
57. The passage of the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 spawned the creation of
federal Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs (section 503
of Public Law 100-71). The mandatory guidelines apply to executive agencies of the federal
government, the uniformed services (excepting certain members of the armed forces), and
contractors or service providers under contract with the federal government (excepting the
postal service and employing units in the judicial and legislative branches). For more
information, see http://www.enotes.com/everyday-law-encyclopedialdrug-testing-2.
58. See, e.g., THE VERMONT LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH SHOP, DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE
LAWS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE,




related to the reality of the work environment and situation. 0 This is
a power that non-unionized workers do not have, and this lack of
power is one that is making for what has really become a random
hodge-podge in the application of privacy laws in the workplace.
Non-unionized workplaces are no different from unionized
workplaces in terms of their unique natures. While it might make
some sense for a religious organization to be concerned about whether
it is possible to unearth any information on the internet about how an
employee engaged in arguably immoral behavior ten years earlier, it
would (at least in my opinion) make little sense to discharge an
employee at Home Depot because someone was able to unearth a
picture taken 10 years earlier where the employee was seen shopping
at Lowe's. It would also make little sense if the employee were
discharged for an employer's opinion about morals or beliefs, if
morals and beliefs had no relation to the job being performed.
However, private employees can do little to negotiate such a
provision as a condition of employment, and there are few states that
have statutes that are of any benefit to private employees. Thus,
unions, if they take the initiative, can not only negotiate clauses that
protect its own employees, but may be able to provide examples of
clauses that other employers can use as guideposts in formulating
their own work rules.
In her article, Carpe Diem: Pivacy Protection n Employment
Act,61 Professor Ariana Levinson62 has proposed a model statute that,
if adopted, would clarify and update federal legislation concerning
employee monitoring. 63 While this author is in support of a federal
60. For example, teachers are not typically subject to random drug tests and their unions
have achieved a sort of balance on that particular privacy issue by arguing that the tests are
unwarranted. See, e.g., Natalie Potts, Teachers not Subject to Drug Tests, WBBJTV
EYEWITNESS NEWS (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.wbbjtv.com/news/local/No-Random-Drug-
Tests-for-Teachers-176048751.html. Similarly, unions could investigate whether monitoring
is warranted for other professions, for example monitoring the work terminal of a forklift
driver.
61. See Ariana R. Levinson, Cape Diem: Privacy Protection in Employment Act, 43
AKRON L. REV. 331 (2010), available athttp://www.uakron.edu/dotAsset/1669393.pdf.
62. University of Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
63. There have been attempts to increase workers' privacy through new legislation. In
1993, Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) introduced the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act.
The measure would have established a standard for notice, access to information, and use
limitations. However, the bill did not leave the committee to which it was assigned. See
generally Workplace Privacy, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/workplace/ (last visited Dec.
12, 2012). The Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act (NEMA) was introduced by
Representative Charles Canady (R-FL) and Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) in 2000.
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statute that would clarify and update laws concerning monitoring
employees, the scope of this article is of a smaller scale and seeks to
deal only with those employees who are covered by collective
bargaining agreements. The article also seeks to point out that
different work situation may require different rules regarding
employee monitoring and that although an overarching federal statute
might be preferable, it would be difficult or a federal statute of this
nature to cover many of the unique situations that occur in many blue
collar situations. Thus, it is this author's position that work rules
and/or collective bargaining agreements may become a good starting
point for protecting workers' privacy rights while also allowing
employers appropriate authority over their employees.
It should be noted that the National Labor Relations Act already
protects group communications where the communications relate to
improving working conditions. However, issues arise when
constructive discourse crosses over to defamation, threats, or general
public denigration of one's employer. It is this author's position that
clearer provisions relating to the reality of what communications do
occur would be beneficial for both employer and employee.
PROPOSED PROVISION
Here is a proposed "base" provision that this author believes
would add clarity to what type employer monitoring is permissible
and what will result in the discipline of an employee:
All employer issued equipment may be monitored. This includes
cellphones and laptops that employees may use for personal purposes.
Personal use of employer issued equipment is permissible,
within reason, during working hours. Examples of "within reason"
include checking email or social networking sites during lunch hours
or breaks, making personal calls during breaks, and accepting
emergency phone calls at any time. The company reserves the right to
monitor phone and internet use in the workplace for business-related
reasons or for the purpose of assessing productivity.
The content of messages (including text messages and email
messages) will not be routinely scrutinized for content unless it comes
to the attention of the employer that the employee is engaging in
illegal activities or those that otherwise violate company rules (such
NEMA would have established a private right of action against employers who failed to give
notice of wire or network monitoring. This measure also never left committee.
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as alleged harassment or threatening of other employees). Any
communication produced on employer issued equipment is subject to
this rule, including those communications sent during non-working
hours. The company reserves the right to monitor the use of its
property for the purpose of guarding against illegal activity. The
employer reserves the right to audit, inspect, and/or monitor
employees' use of the Internet, including all file transfers, browsing
history, and emails, as deemed appropriate.
Participation on a social network (by way of text or traditional
posting) is forbidden during an employee's working hours, with the
exception of scheduled breaks.64
An employee may be disciplined for postings in public forums
that, among other things, suggest participation in an illegal activity,
make any type of threatening or violent comments, or disparage the
reputation of the employer or a colleague in a way that does not
amount to a constructive discourse about working conditions.
Examples of public forums include internet blogs that the employee
personally maintains, other internet blogs that post participant
comments, listservs (including closed membership listservs), and
posts on social network sites that are not password protected. This
rule applies even when the employee is using his/her own personal
electronic equipment, and applies if a pseudonym used in a posting is
traced back to the employee.
An employee may not be disciplined for a private conversation
with any individual, unless the conversation involves a suggestion of
participation in an illegal activity, or makes threatening or violent
commentary directed toward a co-worker or supervisor. This rule
covers phone conversations, text messages, email exchanges, and
private chats on social networking sites. However, if the exchange
occurs with a co-worker during working hours and is brought to the
attention of a supervisor, the employer has the discretion to impose
discipline.
Any electronic communication that is to be used for purposes of
discipline is to be fully documented and brought to the employee's
attention prior to discipline being imposed. The employer is entitled
to union representation when confronted with any evidence that might
result in discipline and is entitled to respond to the charges.
64. It should be noted that access to some websites may be blocked by an employer,
which provides a good protection against web surfing that results in a lack of productivity.




Legislation relating to employee monitoring is a hodge-podge of
statutes that do not directly apply to the technologically advanced way
that most communications are made today. In addition, statutes,
where they exist, neither address situations related to employer
scrutiny of communications that an employee might regard as
personal (such as posting on a blog or on Facebook), nor those where
the employee communicates on his or her own personal device during
non-working hours. Because many employees now work on the go
on either employer-issued equipment or on personal equipment, the
lines between non-working hours and working hours have become
blurred, as have become the lines between work and non-work
activities. Employees have a right to know what behaviors are
considered impermissible. Moreover, it is to the benefit of employers
to have clear, enforceable policies that set the guidelines for what is
expected from employees.
It is this author's position that although a federal statute could
provide some of the guidelines necessary for a 21st century
workforce, passing an all-encompassing statute that covers various
unique workplace situations will be difficult. Moreover, although
various proposed statutes deal with restrictions on monitoring, they do
not necessarily encompass situations where disciplines from
communications are made known to an employer although not
"monitored" in the traditional sense. The author believes that it
would be beneficial to both employers and employees to define what
communications thought to be "personal" may result in workplace
discipline.
Because non-unionized employees have no ability to bargain
over rules and regulations in the workplace, this author believes that
union negotiation can be the starting point for drafting realistic rules
affecting electronic privacy as it relates to the workplace. If this
occurs, the provisions adopted as work rules may become the basis
for standardized policies governing electronic privacy rights and
result in an increased understanding of rights and restrictions from
both the vantage point of the employer and the employee.
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